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TRANSFORMASI URUSTADBIR KERAJAAN TEMPATAN  
DAN PARTISIPASI AWAM 
SATU KAJIAN EMPAT DESA DI JAWA  
SETELAH REFORMASI 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Gerakan reformasi telah membawa perubahan hampir di segala aspek kehidupan 
sosial di Indonesia. Seiring dengan tuntutan ke arah demokrasi, Undang-Undang 
No.22/1999 mengenai Pemerintahan Daerah telah menciptakan dasar hukum bagi 
terbentuknya urustadbir tempatan yang baik dan lebih banyak partisipasi awam 
dalam proses pembuatan keputusan negara. Undang-Undang ini memberikan 
kekuatan politik yang lebih besar bagi parlimen tempatan (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah/DPRD) dan membentuk parlimen peringkat desa (Badan 
Perwakilan Desa/BPD) di desa-desa. 
Kajian ini memfokuskan pada transformasi urustadbir pada peringkat desa setelah 
reformasi. Hujahnya adalah bahawa sekarang hubungan antara bupati dan DPRD 
di peringkat kabupaten berbeda dengan hubungan antara lurah dan BPD di desa. 
Di peringkat kabupaten ditemukan bahawa kekuasaan yang diberikan DPRD 
secara awam telah disalahgunakan untuk kepentingan peribadi. Di peringkat desa 
ditemukan bahawa BPD melakukan peranan penting dalam urustadbir peringkat 
desa. Kenyataannya, kekuasaan terbagi antara BPD dan urustadbir peringkat 
desa. Mekanisme kawal dan imbang semakin dapat dilakukan sehingga proses 
pembuatan keputusan di peringkat desa menjadi lebih telus dan 
bartanggungjawab. Kajian membuktikan bahawa perubahan-perubahan penting 
telah berlaku dalam urustadbir peringkat desa, khasnya dalam BPD, di kalangan 
pegawai pentadbiran peringkat desa, Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat 
Desa/LKMD, Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga/PKK dan badan yang lain.  
Sementara itu, suasana politik yang lebih terbuka setelah reformasi telah memberi 
dorongan kepada masyarakat desa untuk mengorganisasi dan 
mengkonsolidasikan diri mereka melalui inisiatif lembaga tempatan. Pegawai 
pentadbiran peringkat desa bukan lagi aktor utama dalam proses pembuatan 
keputusan di desa-desa. BPD sekarang juga terlibat, meskipun peranannya 
sebagai wakil masyarakat desa masih belum dapat terpenuhi. Juga, perempuan 
menjadi lebih terlibat dalam lembaga politik desa. Selama ini, belum ada NGO 
yang berbasis di desa, namun masyarakat desa sudah mulai bekerjasama dengan 
NGO yang berbasis di kecamatan dan desa-desa. Semua ini merupakan tanda-
tanda menuju ke arah demokrasi di desa. 
Bagaimanapun, aktor utama di lembaga lama yang telah didirikan pada waktu 
Orde Baru juga masih mempertahankan kedudukan mereka dalam keadaan politik 
baru ini. Konflik kepentingan antara pemain lama dan elit politik baru di dalam BPD 
sering berlaku juga. Kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa penyelesaian konflik 
semacam itu dipengaruhi oleh nilai-nilai budaya, adat tempatan, keperibadian 
pemimpin dan komposisi plural dari setiap desa. 
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THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE  
AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
A STUDY OF FOUR VILLAGES IN JAVA  
AFTER THE REFORMASI 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The reformasi movement brought about changes in nearly all aspects of social life 
in Indonesia. Along with the thrust toward democracy, Law No.22/1999 on regional 
administration has established the legal foundation for local good governance and 
more public participation in the country’s decision making process. This law grants 
more political power to the district parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, 
DPRD) and provides for the formation of the local council (Badan Perwakilan Desa, 
BPD) in the villages.  
This study focuses on the transformation of village governance after reformasi. It 
argues that the current relationship between the Bupati and the DPRD in the 
district level is different from that between the Lurah and the BPD in the village. At 
the district level, it is found that the power that was given to the DPRD has been 
generally misused for personal narrow interests. At the village level, it is found out 
that the BPD has been taking up an important role in village governance. In fact, 
power is shared between the BPD and the village government. A check and 
balance mechanism is being put into place so that the decision-making process at 
the village level is becoming more transparent and accountable. This study 
documents important changes that have occurred in village administration, 
particularly in the BPD, the village government officials, LKMD, PKK, and other 
institutions. 
At the same time, the more open political atmosphere after reformasi has given 
impetus to the villagers to organise and consolidate themselves via locally initiated 
institutions. Village government is no longer the sole actor in the decision-making 
process in the villages. The BPD is now involved too, though its role as the 
representative of the villagers remains unfulfilled. Also, women are becoming more 
involved in village-level political institutions. As yet, no NGOs are based in the 
villages, but villagers are starting to work with NGOs based in the sub-districts and 
the towns. All these are signs pointing towards democratisation in the villages.  
However, the key actors in the old institutions that were established during the New 
Order have also reconstituted their positions in the new political setting in the 
villages. Conflicts of interests between the old players and the new political elites in 
the BPD are also common. This study shows that the process of settling such 
conflicts is influenced by cultural values, local customs, personality of leaders and 
the pluralist composition of each village.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Local Government And Politics 
 
1.1.1 Decentralisation and Local Governance in Indonesia  
 
 Decentralization – especially democratic decentralization – has become 
something of a trend in recent years in less developed countries. Compared to 
Africa and Latin America, however, decentralization has progressed slower in 
Southeast Asia. This is so because senior bureaucrats and especially politicians in 
Southeast Asia have been less inclined to devolve powers and resources onto 
institutions, especially elected institutions, than in other two regions.  
All sorts of governments -leftist, rightist and centrist- have experimented with 
one or another form of decentralization, usually including some democratic content. 
The autocratic governments often see decentralization as a substitute for 
democracy at the top. While democratic governments see it as a means of 
deepening democracy1. 
Together with the wave of democratization over the Southeast Asia region, 
a reform movement emerged in Indonesia after the devastating economic crisis 
and political turmoil of 1997-1998. The reformasi (lit.reform movement) which led to 
the demise of the New Order regime, have introduced important changes within 
                                                 
1 James Manor,   “Decentralization and Local Governance: Opportunities and Challenges”  Institute 
of Development Studies University of Sussex, UK, 2003. 
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Indonesian politics permitting significant reforms in local politics and village 
government too.  
The new democratic system is characterized by the introduction of 
multiparty competitive elections, checks and balances between the executive, the 
legislative and the judicial, a free press and guarantees of civil liberties.  The 
government also drafted a legal framework for new centre-regional relations, as 
codified in the Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Governance and Law No.25/1999 on 
Financial Balance between the Central and Regional Governments.  
Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Governance introduced two important features, 
first, devolving authorities, functions and services to districts and municipalities; 
second, a separation of powers. This law is a framework that acknowledged 
regional and local needs for autonomy and identity within the constitutional 
provisions of a unitary state.  
Law 22/1999 replaced two previous laws, namely;  Law 5/1974 which 
provided for a uniform and centralized system of governance, and Law 5 /1979 on 
village governance. Accordingly, Law 22 /1999 on Regional Governance was 
expected to accelerate democratisation and ensure good governance at all levels 
of administration in Indonesia.  
There is particular concern whether the moves will result in genuine local 
autonomy given the fact that “the (decentralisation) policy had always been defined 
from the top and is seen as one form of implementing national development 
policy”2 rather than facilitating democratisation. 
                                                 
2 Widodo Yusuf & Christoph Beier, The Indonesian Decentralisation Policy and the District 
Autonomy Pilot Programme (Rome: FAO, mimeo, 1997). 
 3
 Moreover, changing the mindset of public officials who had been 
accustomed to centralised administration is not that easy. After three decades of 
New Order rule, there still exists a strong tradition of centralised bureaucracy3,. 
The law on decentralisation has only laid out the basic guidelines for power 
devolution. The actual governmental functions can only be devolved through more 
detailed supplementary regulations, presidential instructions, and provincial and 
local government regulations. They also have to be accompanied by staff transfers, 
financial devolution to the lower tiers of government, and local capacity building 
that have been neglected for a long time.  
All of these processes are daunting work for public officials at the centre as 
well as at the local level. In fact, soon after the law was implemented in early 2001, 
many decision makers became frustrated with the decentralisation efforts. 
Moreover, much conflict has emerged along the way to the extent that the central 
government has even thought about revising the law4. 
 Although  Laws  No. 22 of 1999 and No. 25 of 1999 were hastily enacted 
and there were loopholes in the stipulations, nonetheless, they  were  generally 
welcomed  because the people desired greater autonomy5. There have been many  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
3 Hirotsune Kimura, “Decentralisation: A New Type of National Integration?”, Jurnal Ketahanan 
Nasional, Gadjah Mada University, 4(3), December, 1999. 
 
4 “Pemerintah akan Evaluasi UU No.22 dan No.25 1999”, Kompas, 24 August 2001. 
 
5 Although there are still many flaws in the two laws on decentralisation, their immediate 
implementation with minimum modification have been welcomed by the local governments. This 
attitude stems from “an embedded distrust of the central government that has accumulated over a 
long period” because there had been many unimplemented regulations during the New Order 
administration. See Widjajanti I. Suharyo, Voices from the Regions: A Participatory Assessment 
of the New Decentralisation Laws in Indonesia (Jakarta: UNSFIR, 2000), p.34. 
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breakthroughs stipulated in laws and governmental regulations. The emphasis for 
autonomy, for example, has been given to the district level assuming that this will 
ensure better governance including better delivery of public services to the people. 
Previously, the candidates for bupati (district head / regency) and walikota (mayor) 
were proposed by the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah / DPRD (local house of 
representatives), but the final decision was virtually made by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. The new law clarifies the separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative branches of government in the regions and requires that the Bupati and 
Walikota be elected through the DPRD. In the previous system, the paradigm for 
public policy makers and governance was based on rigid instruments of authority, 
regulation and fund provision controlled from the top. On the other hand, the new 
paradigm is to be based on competence, flexible funding, de-regulation and market 
mechanisms6. This implies that the central government will no longer be acting as 
a prominent actor in local government. Instead, it will assume the role of setting 
standards of governance and facilitating those who provide public services.  
 The law has been passed, but all the good intentions have not been realised 
yet. Instead, many complex problems have arisen during implementation. It turned 
out that the elected local legislatives, the DPRD members, do not owe their 
position to their special knowledge of local affairs or their technical skills. Many 
                                                 
6 AB Syahrir, Otonomi Daerah: Implementasi dan Masalahnya (Jakarta: Dewan Pertimbangan 
Otonomi Daerah, 2001). 
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were simply proposed as candidates by those parties who secured a sufficient 
number of electoral votes7.  
 This is partly due to the proportional representation system that is used to 
elect members of both the national and regional constituent assemblies. People do 
not directly elect their local legislators but simply vote for political parties. As a 
result, many of the elected local legislators appear to be lacking in education, 
political experience and technical skills. Not surprisingly, they tend to be more 
accountable to the political parties rather than to their constituents8. Since the 
implementation of the decentralisation policy, “money politics” involving local 
legislators have become rampant. This problem is frequently reported in the local 
and national press9.  
 Nonetheless, many local politicians, the press and some academics still 
believe that decentralisation is the only way to ensure local democracy and to 
make local executives accountable to the people. Over the course of the 
decentralisation policy in the last five years, people are witnessing many new 
developments, both negative and positive. On the one hand, there have been 
many reports that decentralisation has created tensions and conflicts, not only 
between the central government and provincial or local government but also 
between provincial and district/local government, between municipal government 
                                                 
7 Syaikhu Usman, Indonesia’s Decentralisation Policy: Initial Experiences and Emerging Problems 
(London: SMERU Working Paper, 2001), p.17. 
 
8 Pratikno, Permasalahan Baru Pengembangan Otonomi Daerah (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada 
University, mimeo, 2000); Shahrir, Otonomi Daerah, p.5. 
 
9 See, for example, Tempo, 25 December 2000. 
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and business associations, and other forms of horizontal conflict10. On the other 
hand, people are now becoming more excited about local governance because of 
greater freedom at that level. They see that their voices are heeded by the local 
officials to some extent, including during elections. This is unlike in the past when a 
bupati (district head) could easily manipulate village elections11. Whether a more 
open political process will usher in better policies and good governance, however, 
remains to be seen. 
 Some measures have been taken to lessen the negative impact of the 
decentralisation policy. This was on account of the fact that many DPRD members 
have been overly critical and counter-productive in their appraisal of the 
accountability reports of the bupati. The national government has introduced 
Government Regulation No.108 of 2000 on the Form of Accountability of the Head 
of Region. However, many believe that this new regulation is against the intention 
of Law No.22 of 1999 as it limits democratic procedures, is inconsistent with 
financial regulations on accountability, and does not provide for public disclosure of 
accountability reports12.  
Yet other new government regulations aimed at overcoming the 
weaknesses in the decentralisation policy have also been introduced. Some of 
these regulations are helpful since they offer more details on the policy, but some 
                                                 
10 Tempo, 12 November 2001. 
 
11 Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta (New York: Cornel University Press, 1962), p.149; 
Colin MacAndrews (ed.), Central Government and Local Government in Indonesia (Singapore: 
East Asian Social Science Monographs, Oxford University Press, 1986), p.32.  
 
12 Owen Podger, Comments on Government Regulation 108/2000 on the Form of Accountability of 
the Head of Region, (Jakarta, CBSDAS, Asian Development Bank, 2000), p.7. 
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others have been counter-productive. It would be a mistake to assume that the 
decentralisation policy resolves all problems in the regions, including threats of 
separatism or some regional under-development, especially since the legal 
infrastructure remains weak. During the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency, for 
example, at least 20 government decrees, 13 presidential instructions, 6 ministerial 
decrees as well as dozens of regional decrees on regional autonomy, many of 
which contradicted one another, were passed13. Hence, there is an urgent need to 
synchronise the many new laws if the decentralisation policy is to succeed. 
 Also, the problem of institutional building – an important element of 
administrative reform that has been long overdue – has become another hurdle for 
implementing a decentralised governance.  The government has set guidelines to 
organise the local apparatus to be managed in a decentralised system through 
Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No.84 of 2000. However, progress 
has been slow either because of a lack of political commitment or because of the 
bureaucratic inertia among the local authorities. In some districts, the 
organisational structures have become excessively large so that the budget for the 
staff has become overly burdensome. In some other districts, however, such 
organisational structures are too small resulting in a local bureaucracy that is 
under-staffed and with a poor record in the delivery of services14. Success of the 
decentralisation policy also depends on whether the necessary changes in the role 
of  the Development Planning Boards (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
                                                 
13 Jakarta Post, 31 December 2001. 
 
14 Syahrir, Otonomi Daerah, p.7. 
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Daerah/Bappeda) that were set up at the provincial (1976) and district (1981) 
levels occur. Unlike the previous role of the Bappeda that was essentially to 
administer, manage and implement a centrally determined set of policies and to co-
ordinate them with the local agencies, the new role of Bappeda requires it to deal 
with political issues too, especially in terms of its relation to the local DPRD, and 
also with the local development-oriented agencies.  
 Hence, there is conflicting evidence with regards to the impact of the new 
decentralisation policy in Indonesia. The local political issues that have arisen in 
recent years harken back to the phenomena of over-politicking at the local level in 
the 1960s associated with the introduction of too many political parties. That 
politicking had a destructive impact on the unity of communities both in the cities 
and in the rural areas15. Moreover, the opening up of politics under reformasi might 
not present equal opportunities for all. This is to say that “those with money or are 
capable of deploying the apparatus of violence might emerge stronger than the 
others under the current more democratic arrangements”16. There are also signs 
that the current policy on decentralisation might move Indonesians to a more 
democratic and responsible system of governance. Some have argued that the 
current dynamics in local politics are good signs for better governance17. Others 
see the re-emergence of “everyday level of low politics” in the villages as a 
                                                 
15 Selosoemardjan, The Social Changes in Jogjakarta, p.202. 
 
16 Vedi R. Hadiz, “Power and Politics in North Sumatra: The Uncompleted Reformasi” in Edward 
Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds.), Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and 
Democratisation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p.130. 
 
17 Indra J. Pilliang, “Mencermati Demokrasi Lokal”, Kompas, 23 July 2002; Harun Husein, 
“Menyongsong Pilkada Langsung”, Republika, 23 September 2003. 
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revitalisation of democracy18. There is a lot of excitement about the new 
possibilities allowed by regional autonomy and democratisation, and people are 
seizing these new opportunities19. An important feature of the current situation is 
that the people desire responsive governance. As long as the people do not resort 
to the use of violence, these developments amount to a good start. It is also more 
likely that public participation at the local level would not only be limited to the 
electoral process, but also extend to involvement in decisions taken by public 
agencies and officials. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether political 
reforms at the local level will result in destructive politicking in the community or in 
the strengthening of local democracy and improved public policies at that level.  
 
1.1. 2 Current Issues in the Villages 
 
 In Indonesia, the national government is divided into provinces and 
subsequently districts. Districts are further divided into sub-districts (kecamatan) 
headed by a sub-district officer (camat) who represents the district head. Each 
kecamatan office has a number of state employees (pegawai negeri), usually 
between 10 to 20, who assist the camat with his duties. According to Law No.5 of 
1974, kecamatans were supposed to carry out “de-concentration tasks” and other 
supporting activities to the district government such as collecting statistics, co-
ordinating health services, administering the issuance of identity cards, distributing 
                                                 
18 Hans Antlöv, “Not Enough Politics! Power, Participation and the New Democratic Polity in 
Indonesia” in Aspinall & Fealy, Local Power and Politics in Indonesia, p.85. 
 
19 Hans Antlöv, The Making of Democratic Local Governance in Indonesia, (Jakarta: Ford 
Foundation, mimeo, 2002). 
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voluntary workers, etc. The new law (No.22 of 1999) has revoked the basic 
principles and many articles in Law No.5 of 1974 on Regional Administration and 
Law No.5 of 1979 on Village Administration. However, with regards to the 
kecamatan, there are no substantial changes in the new law – the only article 
which refers to the kecamatan in the new law states that the kecamatan is a local 
agency (perangkat daerah), and that it should be given more roles in order to co-
ordinate development activities more effectively at the village level.  
Below the kecamatan is the level of village government. There are more 
than 67.000 villages in Indonesia. According to the current legal system, there are 
two kinds of village government, desa and kelurahan. Desa is the lowest level of 
government with the rights to manage its own affairs. The desa elects its own 
village head (Kepala Desa) who  may be granted the use of village land called 
tanah bengkok (or appanage) in lieu of salary. The system of tanah bengkok, 
however, generally applies in parts of Java and only rarely elsewhere in Indonesia. 
The Kelurahan do not have rights to manage their own affairs. They are staffed by 
a head (the Lurah) and a secretariat, all of whom are salaried state employees 
assigned by the Bupati. Most kelurahan are in urban areas where there is little or 
no possibility of providing land to village officials in lieu of salary. Besides Law 
No.22 of 1999, further regulations for village administration are to be found in 
several Ministry of Home Affairs decrees: No.63 of 1999 on the Implementation of 
Desa and Kelurahan Administration; No.64 of 1999 on Desa Administration; and 
No.65 of 1999 on Kelurahan Formation and Administration. 
The substantive change in the new law is in relation to the position, role, and 
membership of village councils. Previously, according to Law No.5 of 1979, the 
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desa government consisted of the village head assisted by a village secretary and 
other appointed officials including hamlet heads and a Lembaga Musyawarah 
Desa (LMD) – a consultative council consisting of village officials and other 
appointed village notables. The village head was also ex officio chairman of the 
LMD and the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (LKMD), the village 
government’s vehicle for developmental planning. This arrangement indicates that 
neither the LMD nor the LKMD were really independent from the executive20. With 
the introduction of Law No.22 of 1999, an independent council called Badan 
Perwakilan Desa  (BPD) has been established “to protect the local norms, to draft 
village regulations, to articulate people’s aspiration, and to supervise desa 
administration”21. The BPD members, ranging between 9 to 13 depending on the 
size of the village, are to be selected by the people. The BPD is a legislative body 
and is  separated from the village executives.  
As a legislative body, BPD has the right to monitor the kepala desa, to 
approve the village budget, and even the right to propose to the bupati that the 
kepala desa be removed from his post22, although the final decision is left in the 
hands of the bupati. Local regulations and budgets are decided by the BPD and 
the village government while higher authorities need only to be informed about the 
decisions. Therefore, it is implicit in the new law that the kepala desa have triple 
                                                 
20 Mubyarto & Loekman Soetrisno, Integrated Rural Development in Indonesia (New Delhi: CIRDAP 
Report Series, Sterling Publishers, 1989), p.114. It is reported in this study that LKMD was 
inactive in promoting community participation and co-ordinating development. This was because 
it was dominated by the village bureaucracy, particularly the village head.  
 
21 Article 104, Law No.22 of 1999. 
 
22 Article No.17 Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri No.63, 1999. 
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accountability: they are subject to village elections every five years; they are 
responsible to the village population through the BPD, and they must also provide 
a yearly accountability report to the bupati23. The new law has strengthened village 
autonomy considerably, and the separation of powers in village administration will 
be more conducive for democratic checks and balances. Another important feature 
of the new law on village administration is that the nomenclature for desa can be 
adjusted to the local custom, for example it can be called a banjar in Bali, a nagari 
in Minang, or a lembang in Toraja. Accordingly, local elements have been 
incorporated into the new law on village administration.  
Villages throughout Indonesia have begun to form their BPDs. In some 
villages, people still doubt the capability of the newly appointed BPD members to 
draft village development projects, to monitor and to control the policies of the 
village headman and his officials, as was the case with the former LMD where the 
village council members were simply co-opted by the village’s executives. Other 
cases show the emerging issues of village “political instability” and changes that 
might be forthcoming24.  
In Klaten, one of the districts in Central Java, there are cases where the 
relationships between the BPD and the kepala desa have become rather strained. 
In the village of Tumpukan, the BPD’s wish to reduce the appanage or tanah 
bengkok in order to increase the village’s revenues, has been strongly opposed by 
the kepala desa. In the villages of Bero and Kanoman, the BPDs have rejected the 
                                                 
23 Antlöv, The Making of Democratic Local Governance in Indonesia, p.8. 
 
24 Francis Wahono, “Kendala-kendala dalam Demokrasi Desa”, Jendela Forum, April, 2001. 
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bupati‘s decision to re-activate the kepala desa and do not acknowledge his 
administration25. One might still argue, however, that these tensions are part of the 
democratisation process. The fact is that such kinds of discords have intensified in 
villages since the enactment of new regulations on BPD. These cases also reflect 
that there are still loopholes in Law No.22 of 1999 and Ministry of Home Affairs 
Decree No.64 of 1999 concerning the BPD, given the fact that insofar there are no 
clear guidelines yet on how to control the BPD members, and to whom they are 
supposed to be responsible.  
Deviations have also occurred in the implementation of village autonomy by 
the district government. In the district of Sumedang, West Java, for example, the 
local government ruled that the BPD Election Commission has the right to 
“administratively select” who can be a BPD candidate. If this be the case, the legal 
framework might allow a village headmen to single-handedly appoint his loyal 
followers to the Commission, which then decides who is allowed to contest for BPD 
seats26. The distortions, and the practices they allow, have been recognized by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ordinance No.64/1999 has since been revised. In 
November 2001, it was replaced by Presidential Decree No.76/2001 on General 
Guidelines for Village Regulations. However, only some details have been 
                                                 
25 Nur Tjahjono, “BPD Momok bagi Kades dan Perangkatnya”, Suara Merdeka, 27 September 
2001. 
 
26 Hans Antlöv, Village Governance and Local-Level Autonomy in Indonesia (Jakarta: Ford 
Foundation, mimeo, 2002). Other forms of deviations in the BPD member elections were also 
found in a study of five villages in the provinces of Jogjakarta and Central Java. See AA. Ari 
Dwipayana & Sutoro Eko (eds.), Membangun Good Governance di Desa, (Jogjakarta: IRE, 
2003), p.83. 
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changed. The basic distortions remain as many of the Peraturan Daerah (District 
Regulations) stipulated under the previous regulations are still maintained.  
Another interesting case concerns the BPD in the village of “Sariendah” of 
Bandung district, West Java. The BPD members in this village have been very 
enthusiastic and active while their relationships with the kepala desa have been 
fairly good. All the budget allocations in the village were intensively discussed 
between the BPD and the kepala desa, including the road and irrigation projects, 
social safety net funds, and so on. However, it appears that the BPD’s sense of 
priorities might be misplaced for they were also enthusiastic about building an 
office for the BPD, the first in the sub-district, and even building a swimming pool27-
surely an unnecessary and extravagant project at the village level. Fortunately, not 
every member agreed to the building projects. This case illustrates that some of 
the BPD in the villages have been too ambitious and that their proposed projects 
may not benefit the common people. Additionally, conflicts with the kepala desa 
can also jeopardize the developmental goals of the village.  
                                                 
27 Antlöv, The Making of Democratic Local Governance in Indonesia, p.10. 
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Table 1.1. Village governance in the 1979 and 1999 laws 
 Law 5/79 Law 22/1999 
Definition of 
village 
A territorial entity 
 
A legal community 
Name of village 
and headman 
Mandatory desa and kepala 
desa all over Indonesia 
Districts can legislate for 
the use of traditional 
names for “village” and 
“headman’ 
Establishment 
of new village  
Initiated by sub-district, 
approved by district 
chairman 
 
Initiated by villagers, 
approved by district 
government and 
parliament  
Village 
institutions 
Appointed Village Assembly 
(LMD) and Village 
Community Resilience 
Board (LKMD) under the 
authority of the headman. 
No other institutions 
permitted 
Elected village council 
(BPD) with far-reaching 
rights and autonomy, plus 
other institutions that the 
village sees fit to establish 
Village 
government 
Headman 
 
Headman and village 
council 
Village 
headman 
Appointed by and 
accountable to the district 
government, maximum term 
of office of 16 years 
Appointed by and account-
able to village council, after 
approval from district 
government, maximum 
term of office of 10 years 
Dismissal of 
headman 
Proposed by sub-district, 
approved by district 
Proposed by village 
council, approved by 
district government 
Village budget Drafted by headman and 
LMD, approved by district 
government 
Drafted and approved by 
village council together 
with headman 
Village funding Block grant from above Block grant and local 
sources
Village-owned 
enterprises 
Not allowed Allowed 
 
Indices of 
Autonomy 
None. Villages strictly under 
the authority of the sub-
district 
Villagers have the right to 
reject governmental 
programs not accomp-
anied by funds, personnel 
or infrastructure, and to 
draft regulations 
Implementation 
and oversight 
Ministry of Home Affairs District government 
Source: Adapted from Antlöv, 2002 
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 Nonetheless, there are some discernible changes in the villages after these 
political reforms. First, the power that was concentrated in the hands of the formal 
bureaucracy and some informal leaders in the village has shifted to new actors, 
including those who were previously considered “the opposition”. These opposition 
groups -- the political party activists, the youth representatives and village ‘interest 
groups’ -- are now increasingly included in decision-making. Sometimes, conflicts 
between village officials and these former opposition elements have led to the use 
of coercion, strikes, and physical violence. Second, the idea of granting local 
autonomy to the village has significantly ruled out the upward accountability of the 
village political elites. Unfortunately, such a leeway can be manipulated or be 
misused by village political elites to restore “feudal” practices and smaller scale 
authoritarianism. Third, the multi-party system that has been adopted together with 
the political reform may bring about factionalism at the village level based on party 
affiliation, religion, and communalism. As the restrictive doctrine of ‘floating mass’ 
is lifted and political parties are allowed to penetrate into the village, ideological 
conflicts at the village level might result due to lack of understanding of 
democracy28.  
However, some positive aspects of political reform are also visible. In line 
with the new policy that the nomenclature for village can be adjusted to coincide 
with traditional village institutions and local customs29, village development might 
become more participatory.  A change in nomenclature for villages might seem to 
                                                 
28 Cornelis Lay, Central-Regional Relations in Indonesia: Problems and Prospects (Jakarta: LIPI, 
1998); Kutut Suwondo, Otonomi dan Partisipasi Masyarakat Desa (Yogyakarta: FPPM & Ford 
Foundation, 2000). 
 
29 Article 4, Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri No.64 of 1999. 
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be trivial. But, in the Indonesian context, it conveys an important message because 
the previous regulation (Law No.5 of 1974) imposed the desa as the uniformed 
nomenclature for villages and standardized organisational structure in the villages. 
This stipulation was interpreted by most local authorities as centralisted and simply 
concerned with regulation. Recent studies have revealed that a dialogue between 
local customs and modernity has characterised development in many Indonesian 
villages30 and encouraged political participation at the local level.  
 Following such fundamental changes in the relationships between village 
executives and legislators, communities at the village level are becoming aware of 
how their villages are being administered, particularly on how the village resources 
and other acquired resources are being used by the village executives. The BPD, 
for example, may not represent all the groups in the community. However, as it 
becomes more independent of the executives, it is likely to encourage public 
participation, not only in the elections for the village headman but also in the day-
to-day workings of village administration. It is within the context of these 
fundamental changes that we ask these research questions :  
1. What are the patterns of political changes at the village level?  
2. What are the factors determining political changes at the village level? 
3. Are there changes in the decision-making process at the villages? 
4. Is there a shift from the ‘private politics’ of individual bureaucrats’ to the 
‘public politics’ of village decision-making involving other institutions?  
                                                 
30 P.M. Laksono, “Perception of Volcanic Hazards: Villagers Versus Government Officials in Central 
Java” in Dove, Michael R. (ed.), The Real and Imagined Role of Culture in Development: Case 
Studies from Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), p.272. 
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These are among the important questions to be answered in this study. The 
focus of the study is on village politics, on the grounds that the village constitutes 
the smallest unit of governance, which reflects general political characteristics in 
Indonesia. However, it is also expected that the village’s relationships with 
institutions, personnel and processes at the district level, will also be explored and 
explained. 
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1.2. The Theoretical Framework 
 
1.2.1 Good Local Governance 
 
 As the problems of development in the new global economy become more 
complex, the continuing effort of national governments to search for solutions 
requires more ingenious and vibrant strategies. Among the facts that have to be 
faced is that the dimensions of dynamic development are not necessarily 
dependent upon the traditional apparatus of the state. Current debates on 
development questions are encompassing elements of civil society with all the 
institutions, organisations and structures outside the state and increasingly 
focused on the question of governance involving the civil society. At the same 
time, strict economic parameters that have been dominating many discussions 
on development in the past are no longer suitable for dealing with development 
issues nowadays. Leaders, policy makers, civil society groups and the private 
sector currently have to be more familiar with non-economic issues such as 
democratisation, civil society, governance, decentralisation, transparency and 
accountability.  
 A common way to understand transformation toward democracy is to 
observe the interaction between the state and civil society. This conceptual 
framework is based on the assumption that when civil society is relatively strong 
vis-à-vis the state, democracy prevails. However, when the state is strong and 
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civil society weak, democracy fails31. Therefore, democratisation is understood 
as a process of strengthening civil society. The concept of civil society is 
inextricably related to the question of human rights and civil liberties. Civil 
society’s power is conceived in opposition to the state’s power. 
 Another concept of civil society, however, argues that the state and civil 
society do not always oppose each other. Civil society can be thought of as one 
of the two fundamental elements of contemporary governance32. One element is 
represented by the basic institutions of governance, which include the executive, 
legislative, judicial and regulatory agencies at all levels of governments. These 
institutions, which are in essence the principal organs of government, are 
responsible for the making of public policy, its implementation and its monitoring. 
The other element is the environment within which these organisations function, 
referred to as civil society. It includes all forms of citizen initiated political action, 
from the individual local residents to the organising of large numbers of individual 
citizens into mass organisations of modern society – political parties, 
associations of business people and workers, various single and multiple issue 
focused groups and other organisations and agencies which exist in between 
and seek to influence political and policy-making processes. Therefore, civil 
society includes the news media, unions, local neighbourhood organisations, 
parent-teacher associations, private sector bodies and an endless array of formal 
                                                 
31 Arief Budiman (ed.), State and Civil Society in Indonesia (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Monash University, 1990), p.3. 
 
32 United Nations Development Programme, Local Governance: Report of the United Nations 
Global Forum on Innovative Policies and Practices in Local Governance (Gothenburg: UNDP, 
1996), Ch.3. 
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and informal organisations outside the public realm, including the so-called non-
governmental organisations (NGOs).  
 Nevertheless, whichever conceptual term is used for civil society, one 
thing is  common: strengthening civil society is understood as a prerequisite for 
political development or for the quest toward democracy. A vibrant civil society is 
a critical precondition for more equitable, democratic, pluralistic and humane 
governance. In modern life where the people’s needs have become varied and 
complex, it is almost impossible to think of the option to place all public affairs in 
the hands of the state. Reinforcing and empowering civil society has become a 
common strategy for democratisation in many countries. In the context of political 
transition in Asia, it is also believed that empowering civil society is an important 
condition in consolidating democracy33. 
 “Governance” is a key concept in discussions about the relationship 
between the state and civil society.  The term “governance” is intended to 
overcome the drawbacks of the use of the term “government” which essentially 
refers to political functions and “public administration” generally viewed in terms 
of more technocratic pursuits34. Since governance is also a term widely used in 
connection with private sector management, it reminds us of the fact that there 
are commonalities between the two sectors in this respect. In addition, 
governance is also a more neutral concept comprising the complex mechanisms, 
                                                 
33 Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, “Towards Consolidated Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, 
7(2), April 1996; Umaruddin Masdar, “Transisi Demokrasi Indonesia: Peluang Konsolidasi, 
Pembusukan Institusi dan Ancaman Demiliterisasi”, Masyarakat Indonesia, 29(2), 2002. 
 
34 Anonymous, Habitat Professional Forum on Discussion of the Global Campaign for Urban 
Governance (New York: Habitat Forum, mimeo, 2001). 
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processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their 
differences. The fundamental argument for using this concept of governance 
derives from the idea that the political system in modern societies “can no longer 
be conceived in terms of external governmental control of society but emerges 
from a plurality of governing actors”35. There are two possible consequences for 
the application of this concept as has been identified by Kooiman36: 
“1) the pattern of governance is not only the unintended outcome of 
social interaction but also the mechanism through which the actors 
have the capability to act and to govern, hence governing and 
governance are subjected to a permanent process of mutual 
interactions; 2) as governance is strongly linked to the concepts of 
interaction and system, governance is system specific. The 
interactional arrangement can be primarily based on cooperation, 
trust and mutual understanding, but it can also be based on conflict, 
power, and contention”.  
  
The moral ground for governance is laden in the concept of “good 
governance”. This concept perhaps appeared first in the World Bank vocabulary 
and was mainly defined as: “the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”37.  
                                                 
35 Bryan Marin & R. Mayntz (eds.), Policy Network (Boulder: Westview, 1991), backflap. 
 
36 Jan Kooiman (ed.), Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions (London: Sage 
Publications, 1993), p.258. 
 
37 World Bank, “Governance and Development”, Washington D.C., 1992 as quoted by Francois 
Dreyfus, “What Kind of a Citizen for What Kind of State?” in Luc Rouben (ed.), Citizens and the 
New Governance: Beyond the New Public Management (Amsterdam:  IOS Press, 1999), p.8. 
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Good governance is reflected in the “effective, efficient, honest, equitable, 
transparent and accountable performance of governing”38. It is obvious in these 
definitions that good governance implies the conduct of behaviour that must be 
upheld by actors in the social interactions that involve state and civil society 
institutions. Since good governance is definitely in line with democratic principles, 
it is understandable that international organisations are currently urging on the 
imposition of good governance principles in those countries  where authoritarian 
regimes have been replaced by more democratic ones. But the principle of good 
governance is not only an issue for developing countries. The importance of 
accountability, for example, is also recognised in developed countries. Many of 
the “administrative pathologies in the countries do not stem from management 
problems. Instead, they arise from governance problems”39. 
 Good governance defines the norms in the processes and structures that 
guide political and socio-economic relationships. For the UNDP, therefore, good 
governance has three fundamental elements: political, economic and 
administrative.  
“It is political because of its relevance to the process of democratic 
policy formulation that will affect the whole society. It is economic 
because it implies a country’s economic activities which impact upon 
issues of equity, poverty, and quality of life. And good governance is 
certainly administrative because of its relevance to the system of 
policy implementation. Encompassing all the three fundamentals, the 
UNDP defines good governance as a relationship between the state 
                                                 
38 Andi Faisal Bakti (ed.), Good Governance and Conflict Resolution in Indonesia: From 
Authoritarian Government to Civil Society (Jakarta: IAIN Jakarta Press, 2000), p.3. 
 
39 James Q. Wilson, “Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It” as also 
quoted in Ronald B. Cullen & Donald P. Cushman, Transitions to Competitive Government: 
Speed, Consensus, and Performance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 
p.271. 
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and the society that are characterised by: participation, rule of law, 
transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, 
effectiveness and efficiency,  accountability, and strategic vision”40.  
  
The word “local” In “Local Governance” usually refers to the level of the 
village, town or city – and to events that occur just above that level. This may 
seem  obvious, but in the literature on some countries – for example, on China – 
analysts of all nationalities tend to the use the word “local” to refer to anything 
below the national level. It is more precise (and less confusing) to use a more 
limited definition – referring to villages, towns and cities. The word “governance” 
usually refers not just to the actions of governments – although that is very 
important – but to the sum total of arrangements, processes, habits and patterns 
that we find when we ask how a particular society conducts public business.  
Accordingly, the term “decentralization” refers to the transfer of powers 
and resources from higher levels in political systems to lower levels. Most 
analysts concentrate on three types of decentralization. Administrative 
decentralization or deconcentration: the transfer of administrative personnel and 
resources from higher to lower levels   Fiscal decentralization: the transfer of 
financial resources, and authority over their use, from higher to lower levels 
Political or democratic decentralization (sometimes called devolution): the 
                                                 
40 United Nations Development Programme, UNDP and Governance for Sustainable Human 
Development (New York: UNDP policy paper, 2002). See also Goh Ban Lee, Non-Compliance: 
A Neglected Agenda in Urban Governance (Kuala Lumpur: Institute Sultan Iskandar, 2002), 
pp.218-27. 
 
